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ONE SIGNIFICANT STEP: HOW REFORMS TO PRISON
DISTRICTS BEGIN TO ADDRESS POLITICAL INEQUALITY
Erika L. Wood*
INTRODUCTION
Skyrocketing rates of incarceration over the last three decades
have had profound and lasting effects on the political power and
engagement of local communities throughout the United States.
Aggressive enforcement practices and mandatory sentencing laws
have an impact beyond the individuals who are arrested, convicted,
and incarcerated. These policies have wide-ranging and enduring
ripple effects throughout the communities that are most heavily im-
pacted by criminal laws, predominantly urban and minority
neighborhoods. Criminal justice policies broadly impact everything
from voter turnout and engagement, to serving on juries, participat-
ing in popular protests, census data, and the way officials draw
legislative districts. The result is the disengagement, disenfranchise-
ment, and disempowerment of residents of these communities,
many of whom have never had direct contact with law enforcement
or the criminal justice system.
One of the ways that criminal justice policies impact communi-
ties stems from the Census Bureau’s policy of counting people who
are incarcerated as residents of their prison cells rather than of
their home communities, where the majority return within just a
few years. This policy results in more than two million people incar-
cerated on Census Day, being counted as residents of their prison
cells for the entire decade following the census.1
* Professor of Law and Director, Voting Rights and Civic Participation Project, New
York Law School. I am grateful to my NYLS colleagues, Susan Abraham, Carol Buckler, Doni
Gewirtzman, Carlin Meyer, Frank Munger, Lynnise Pantin, and Edward Purcell for their
valuable insight and advice, and the staff of the Mendik Law Library as well as NYLS students
Melissa Ruhry, Danielle Miranda, Rachel Searle, and Rachel Blackhurst for their research
assistance. Thank you as well to Brenda Wright of De¯mos and Peter Wagner from the Prison
Policy Initiative for their wisdom and expertise, and to the editors of the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform for their thoughtful comments and careful edits. Any
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1. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimated the total number of state and federal
prisoners at year-end 2010 to be 1,612,395. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J.
SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Prisoners in 2010, at 1 (2011). In addition, BJS esti-
mated that the total population of county and local jails in 2010 was 748,728. TODD D.
MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES MIDYEAR 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES 1
(2011). Thus, the total number of incarcerated people in 2010 was estimated to be 2,361,123.
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The census counts incarcerated individuals as residents of the
prison, grouping them together with non-incarcerated individuals
living in the surrounding community to form legislative districts.
This inflates the voting strength of the actual constituents who live
outside the prison simply because of their proximity to a correc-
tional facility. Critics labeled this phenomenon “prison-based
gerrymandering.”2
In 2010, New York and Maryland were the first states in the coun-
try to pass laws to correct this imbalance. These new laws were in
place and implemented in time for the 2011 decennial round of
redistricting, the process of drawing new legislative districts for
Congress, state, and local legislatures. Under the 2010 laws, officials
in New York and Maryland undertook a process to remove each
individual who was incarcerated in state prison on Census Day—
April 1, 2010—from their prison district and reallocate that person
back to his or her home address for purposes of drawing new legis-
lative districts.3 An analysis of the implementation of the Maryland
and New York laws reveals three points that should inform the
thinking and advocacy on this issue moving forward.
First, despite the hopes of the Democratic legislators who sup-
ported the legislation and the fears of Republicans who opposed it,
implementation of the laws did not create a partisan shift in either
the Maryland or the New York state legislatures. Democrats did not
gain seats, and Republicans did not lose seats as a result of these
new laws.4 Although partisan jousting has consistently obstructed
similar laws from passing in other states, this analysis shows that
party politics should no longer impede reform.
Second, although they had a minimal effect on state legislative
district lines, the 2010 Maryland and New York laws still achieved
important results. On the local level, the reallocation of incarcer-
ated people back to their home communities likely corrected the
dilution of the voting strength of residents in those home commu-
nities. In doing so, these laws begin to address the harms suffered
by communities when the criminal justice system intrudes upon our
system of democratic representation.
And finally, in addition to these democratic reforms, these laws
contribute to the necessary, ongoing conversation about reforming
our criminal justice system. Implementation of these laws required
2. See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymandering and the Cur-
rent Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2011); Peter Wagner, Breaking the
Census: Redistricting in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1242
(2012).
3. See infra notes 76–82 and 119–128 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 130–140 and accompanying text.
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Maryland and New York to re-establish a link between each incar-
cerated individual and his or her home community, signaling a
shift away from viewing the goal of incarceration as isolation and
segregation and towards viewing the goal as rehabilitation and
reintegration.
Part I of this Article explains the problem of prison-based gerry-
mandering and its effects in Maryland and New York. Part II
discusses the 2010 laws and their implementation in both states.
Part III explains that the real impact of these laws was the likely
correction of vote dilution on the very local level in poor and mi-
nority communities disproportionately affected by criminal justice
policies, renewing group power that forms the building blocks of
legislative districts. Finally, Part IV concludes that these reforms
have another value beyond democratic reform; they contribute to a
larger conversation about reforming the criminal justice system.
I. THE CENSUS AND PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING5
To fully understand the imbalance created by prison-based gerry-
mandering, it must be placed in the context of rising incarceration
over the past three decades. In the early 1970s, a shift at the state
and federal level toward mandatory sentencing structures limited
judges’ and prosecutors’ discretion when sentencing defendants.6
These mandatory sentencing laws, followed by the “war on drugs”
and a wave of “three strikes” laws through the 1980s, caused incar-
ceration rates to skyrocket across the country.7 From 1920 to 1970,
incarceration rates remained stable, hovering around 200,000.8 But
between 1972 and 2004, incarceration rates climbed rapidly, in-
creasing by more than 600 percent.9 Today there are 2.2 million
5. Some of the factual research presented in Parts I and II of this Article was originally
presented in ERIKA WOOD, DE¯MOS, IMPLEMENTING REFORM: HOW MARYLAND AND NEW YORK
ENDED PRISON GERRYMANDERING (2014), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/
publications/implementingreform.pdf.
6. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 20 (2006).
7. A thorough exploration of the history of criminal punishment and incarceration in
the United States is beyond the scope of this Article, but remains an important and fascinat-
ing—yet little known—aspect of American history. For further reading see, for example,
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS (2011); DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008); DAVID GARLAND, THE CUL-
TURE OF CONTROL (2001); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990); MARC
MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2006); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW
THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR
(2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
8. MAUER, supra note 6, at 18.
9. Id. at 20.
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people in prison in America; by far the highest incarceration rate in
the world.10
There is no question that these policies disproportionately im-
pact minority communities, particularly African American
communities. Today, more than sixty percent of incarcerated indi-
viduals are racial minorities.11 On any given day, one out of every
ten African American men in their thirties is in prison or jail.12 Afri-
can American men have a thirty-two percent chance of serving
time, Latino men a seventeen percent chance, and white men a six
percent chance.13 In other words, African American men are five
times more likely to serve time in prison than white men.14 The
lasting impact the criminal justice system has on urban, minority
communities explains the significance of how the census counts in-
carcerated people.
A. Census Policy and Redistricting
Once every ten years, the United States conducts the census to
determine the country’s population. The U.S. Constitution requires
this enumeration in order to determine the apportionment for the
U.S. House of Representatives, but today census data is used for
wide ranging calculations. Federal, state, and local governments use
the census data for a variety of purposes. They use census data to
plan and prioritize community services such as where to provide
additional education, public health, infrastructure, and transporta-
tion services. Based on census data, the federal government
distributes more than $400 billion in federal funds to local and
state governments each year.
Officials also rely on census data when drawing legislative dis-
tricts for Congress, the state legislature, and local government.15
State and local governments rely on data compiled by the Census
10. Adam Liptak, U.S. Prison Population Dwarfs That of Other Nations, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 23,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACTS ABOUT PRISONS & PEOPLE IN
PRISON (2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Facts%20About%
20Prisons.pdf.
11. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10.
12. Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/tem-
plate/page.cfm?id=122 (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
13. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10.
14. Id.
15. What We Do, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/about/what.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2015).
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Bureau to draw election district lines, a process known as redistrict-
ing.16 As local populations shift and move, congressional, state,
county, and municipal legislative districts must be redrawn to assure
that each district has an equal population. This in turn protects the
principle of “one person, one vote,” assuring that every voter has
equal representation in our government.17 The Census Bureau pro-
duces several data sets used to design election districts. It releases
data sets on a rolling basis over a period of about a year after the
census is complete. The dataset available for redistricting is created
pursuant to Public Law 94-171, called “PL 94-171” data.18 The PL
94-171 dataset includes age, race, and ethnicity down to individual
blocks.19
In 1790, the First Decennial Census Act directed the U.S. Census
Bureau to enumerate people in their “usual place of abode.”20 To
comply with this requirement, the Bureau established the “usual
residency rule” which remains in effect today. Under this rule, on
Census Day—April 1 of the decennial year—the Bureau counts
each person as a resident of “the place where [that] person lives
and sleeps most of the time.”21 To compile the PL 94-171 data, the
Census Bureau enumerates individuals according to the “usual resi-
dency” rule.22
The Census Bureau classifies certain residential facilities as
“Group Quarters,” including college dormitories, military barracks,
residential treatment centers, psychiatric hospitals, and adult and
juvenile correctional facilities.23 Group Quarters create a challenge
16. See Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No, 94-171, 89 Stat. 1023; Establishment of the 2010
Census Redistricting Data Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 26547 (May 13, 2004).
17. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568–76 (1964) (holding that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires that legislative seats be apportioned on the basis of population). For a
more detailed discussion of the “one person, one vote” principle as it pertains to prison-
based gerrymandering, see infra notes 57–59, 157–62, and accompanying text.
18. Act of Dec. 23, 1975, supra note 16.
19. See id.; see also Public Law 94-171 Requirements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.cen-
sus.gov/rdo/about_the_program/public_law_94-171_requirements.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2015). A “census block” is a physical area set by the U.S. Census Bureau; it is the smallest
geographic unit for which the Census Bureau collects data. In some cases, it will be the same
area as a city block, but especially in rural areas, it can be substantially larger. See Decennial
Management Division Glossary: Census Block, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
dmd/www/glossary.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
20. Act of Mar. 1, 1790, ch. II, § 5, 1 Stat. 101.
21. Residence Rule and Residence Situations for the 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:/
/www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_rules.html (last visited Sept.
24, 2015).
22. See id.
23. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY/PUERTO RICO COMMUNITY
SURVEY GROUP QUARTERS DEFINITIONS 1, http://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/tech
_docs/group_definitions/2010GQ_Definitions.pdf. “Group Quarters” are defined as “a place
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for applying the usual residency rule because individuals staying in
them sometimes consider somewhere else to be their “home,” re-
gardless of where they slept on Census Day.24
Under the usual residency rule, census officials count people
who are incarcerated as residents of the correctional facility, be-
cause that is where they “live and sleep most of the time.”25 As a
result, over the last three decades of increasing incarceration rates,
the Census Bureau counted more than two million individuals as
residents of their prison cells rather than their home communities,
to which most return in just a few years.26
Once the census is complete, states and localities use the data to
draw legislative districts for Congress, the state legislature, and local
government. By relying on the census data, line drawing officials
group incarcerated individuals together with non-incarcerated indi-
viduals living in the surrounding area.27 However, in all but two
states, incarcerated individuals cannot vote.28 Often people in
prison have no ties to the local community beyond being sent there
by the criminal justice system. Consequently, inmates become
“ghost constituents” whose presence helps shape the district, but to
whom the legislator representing the district has no connection or
where people live or stay, in a group living arrangement, that is owned or managed by an
entity or organization providing housing and/or services for the residents.” Id.
24. Different types of Group Quarters are treated differently under the usual residency
rule. College students living away from home are counted at their college residence. Military
personnel living in military barracks in the U.S. are counted at the military barracks.
Merchant Marines are counted at the onshore U.S. residence where they live and sleep most
of the time. People in adult group homes, residential treatment centers, nursing homes and
psychiatric hospitals are counted at the facility. Hospital patients are counted at their resi-
dence. Of particular note, children who are away from home at boarding school are counted
as residents of their parents’ home, but children who are in juvenile detention centers as are
counted as residents of the detention centers. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 21; see also
John C. Drake, Locked Up and Counted Out: Bringing an End to Prison-Based Gerrymandering, 37
WASH. U. J.L. & Pol’y 237, 239–40 (2011).
25. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 21.
26. The question inevitably arises about those sentenced for life who will never return to
their home communities. This is a legitimate question, but it is important to keep in mind
that nationwide, only about three percent of incarcerated people are sentenced to life with-
out parole. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE OF LIFE
SENTENCES IN AMERICA 3 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Life%
20Goes%20On%202013.pdf.
27. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 21.
28. Forty-eight states prohibit people from voting while serving a felony sentence in
prison. See ERIKA L. WOOD, RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 3 (2009); see also JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT (2006). Maine and Vermont are the only two states that
do not disenfranchise based on a felony conviction—people in those states may vote while in
prison. Id. In those two states, incarcerated people maintain residency in their home commu-
nities for voting purposes and vote in their home district by absentee ballot; they do not vote
in the district where they are incarcerated. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 112(14); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2122(a).
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accountability.29 The actual constituents who live near the prison
enjoy inflated voting strength simply because they live near a cor-
rectional facility.30
Moreover, because incarceration rates disproportionately impact
minority and urban communities, census data ultimately erodes vot-
ing strength in these home communities—often located hundreds
miles away—where most incarcerated individuals return.31 The re-
sult is fewer voices and fewer votes, demanding government
accountability and representation by local officials. As prison dis-
tricts artificially inflate, home communities diminish and decline.32
29. Dale Volker, a former New York state senator who represented a district that in-
cluded a large prison stated that his community “has more cows than people” and that he
would choose the cows over incarcerated people as his constituents because “[t]hey would be
more likely to vote for me.” Jonathan Tilove, Minority Prison Inmates Skew Populations as States
Redistrict, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERV., (Mar. 11, 2002), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/news/new
housenews031202.html. Prison-based gerrymandering has other troubling implications. A
legislator whose district depends on the occupants of a correctional facility to meets its popu-
lation requirement has every incentive to keep that prison not just open, but filled to
capacity. This incentive may influence the legislator’s positions on criminal justice policies
and sentencing laws.
30. Prison-based gerrymandering also creates an imbalance between neighboring dis-
tricts. A district that contains a prison will have inflated voting strength compared to a
neighboring district without a prison, creating inequalities between residents of neighboring
communities. One of the most stunning examples of this was in Anamosa, Iowa. See Sam
Roberts, Census Bureau’s Counting of Prisoners Benefits Some Rural Voting Districts, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/us/politics/24census.html?_r=0; see
also Anamosa: Prison-based gerrymandering dilutes your vote, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://
www.prisonersofthecensus.org/story/Anamosa (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). During the 2002
election, Anamosa was divided into four City Council wards of about 1370 people each. Id.
Ward 2 contained a large state prison containing over 1320 incarcerated people. The non-
incarcerated population of Ward 2 was fewer than sixty people. Id. Ward 2’s constituents
therefore wielded twenty-five times more political power than the voters in their neighboring
districts. Id. The City Councilmember chosen to represent Ward 2 was elected by just two
votes total, write-ins from his wife and a neighbor. Id.
31. See PATRICIA ALLARD & KIRSTEN D. LEVINGSTON, ACCURACY COUNTS: INCARCERATED
PEOPLE & THE CENSUS 1 (2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
d/RV4_AccuracyCounts.pdf; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ONCE, ONLY ONCE
AND IN THE RIGHT PLACE: RESIDENCE RULES IN THE DECENNIAL CENSUS 97 (2006), http://www.
nap.edu/catalog/11727/once-only-once-and-in-the-right-place-residence-rules; Peter Wagner
& Eric Lotke, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial Consequences of Counting Prisoners
Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE L. REV. 587, 592 (2004); see also Fletcher v.
Lamone, 831 F.Supp.2d 887, 896 (D. Md. 2011) (concluding that “it would certainly be true
that at least some prisoners will return to their old communities . . . .”); Little v. LATFOR,
No. 2310-2011 at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2011) (noting that there was nothing in the record
indicating that people in prison “have any actual permanency in these locations or have an
intent to remain.”).
32. For a discussion of vote dilution as it relates to prison-based gerrymandering, see
Part III.B, infra.
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B. Prison-Based Gerrymandering in Maryland and New York
Real world examples in New York and Maryland illustrate the im-
pact of prison-based gerrymandering. Baltimore and New York City
both have dense urban neighborhoods largely segregated along ra-
cial and economic lines, burdened by drug crimes and a heavy law
enforcement presence. In both Maryland and New York correc-
tional facilities are located in mostly rural districts, far from the
urban centers that many of those who are incarcerated call home.
1. Maryland
The average annual inmate population in Maryland state correc-
tional facilities is about 27,000.33 The incarceration rate for African
Americans in Maryland is approximately five and a half times that
of whites.34 The total population of Baltimore is approximately
615,000. The city’s population is sixty-three percent African Ameri-
can.35 While one out of ten Maryland residents is from Baltimore,
one out of three people in Maryland’s state prisons is from Balti-
more.36 In 2006 alone, 115,000 people were arrested in the city.37
Within Baltimore, incarceration rates are heavily concentrated in
a handful of neighborhoods. While more than two hundred neigh-
borhoods make up the city of Baltimore,38 seventy-five percent of
Baltimore residents who are incarcerated come from just twenty-
five of those neighborhoods.39 Residents from five of these twenty-
five neighborhoods account for a quarter of those who are
incarcerated.40
While one-third of incarcerated individuals in Maryland come
from Baltimore, eighty-three percent of the state’s twenty-eight cor-
rectional facilities are located in rural or suburban communities
33. MARYLAND GEN. ASSEMBLY DEP’T OF LEG. SERVS., H.B. 496 FISCAL & POLICY NOTE,
2010 Sess., at 2. In Maryland, 380 people, or one percent of all inmates, are sentenced to life
without parole. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 26.
34. MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY
RACE AND ETHNICITY 6 (2007).
35. State and County Quick Facts: Baltimore, Maryland, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU http://quick
facts.census.gov/qfd/states/24/24510.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
36. JUSTICE POLICY INST. & PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, THE RIGHT INVESTMENT? CORREC-
TIONS SPENDING IN BALTIMORE CITY 2 (2015), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justice
policy/documents/rightinvestment_design_2.23.15_final.pdf.
37. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (2009).
38. BALTIMORE CITY DEP’T OF PLANNING, BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOOD PROFILES, https://
baltimore2006to2010acsprofiles.wordpress.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
39. JUSTICE POLICY INST. & PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, supra note 36, at 13.
40. Id. at 15.
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outside of Baltimore.41 The facilities are, on average, located sixty
miles outside of Baltimore; and, five facilities are more than one
hundred miles away.42 Notably, Maryland spans only 12,000 square
miles. The average length of time served in Maryland state prisons
is two and a half years.43
This prison geography creates a significant political imbalance.
For example, in 2010, Somerset County, the First County Commis-
sion District included a large prison that made up sixty-four percent
of its population. As a result, each resident in that district had 2.7
times as much influence as residents in other districts.44 Similarly,
in 2010, eighteen percent of residents in County Commission Dis-
trict 2B were incarcerated, giving every four District 2B residents as
much political influence as five residents elsewhere in the state.45
Of the 5,268 African Americans in District 2B, ninety percent were
incarcerated residents from other parts of the state.46
2. New York
The imbalance created by prison-based gerrymandering has
been particularly severe in New York. In 2014, the total population
of New York state correctional facilities was 54,142.47 Currently,
nearly half of all people in prison—forty-five percent—come from
New York City.48 This number dropped in recent years; in 2002,
approximately seventy percent of inmates, nearly 70,000, came
from New York City.49 Nearly a quarter of people incarcerated in
41. Id. at 2; Correctional Facility Locator, MD. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY & CORR. SERVS., http://
www.dpscs.state.md.us/locations/prisons.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
42. Correctional Facility Locator, supra note 41.
43. MD. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MARYLAND DIMINUTION CREDIT SYSTEM 7 (2011),
http://dls.state.md.us/data/polanasubare/polanasubare_coucrijusncivmat/Dimunition-
Credits.pdf.
44. See Peter Wagner & Olivia Cummings, Importing Constituents: Incarcerated People &
Political Clout in Maryland, PRISON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar.
4, 2010), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/md/report.html; PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE,
ENDING PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING WOULD AID THE AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTE IN MARY-
LAND (2010), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/factsheets/md/africanamericans.pdf.
45. PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, supra note 44.
46. Id.; see also Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F. Supp.2d 887, 893 (D. Md. 2011) aff’d, 133 S.
Ct. 29 (2012) (mem.).
47. N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS. & COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, UNDER CUSTODY REPORT AS OF JAN-
UARY 1, 2014, at ii, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/2014/UnderCustody_Re
port_2014.pdf. In New York, 246 individuals, or less than one percent of inmates, are sen-
tenced to life without parole. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 26, at 6.
48. N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 47.
49. Jeffrey Fagan, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods,
30 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 1551, 1555 (2002).
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New York come from seven state senate districts representing mi-
nority communities in New York City.50 The incarceration rates for
African Americans in New York is nine and a half times that of
whites; for Latinos it is four and a half times that of whites. Seventy-
three percent of those currently incarcerated in New York are Afri-
can American and Latino.51
There are fifty-five state prisons in New York, and only four are
located in New York City.52 The rest are located in upstate, rural
communities. Approximately seventy-five percent of New York’s
prisons are located more than one hundred miles from New York
City, more than sixty percent are located over two hundred miles
from the city, and over a third are located more than three hun-
dred miles from the city.53 The average length of time served in
New York prisons is 3.5 years.54
The policy of basing legislative districts on prison populations
creates an imbalance not just between upstate and downstate com-
munities in New York, but between neighboring upstate
communities as well. A district with a prison has inflated voting
strength compared to any other district without a prison, including
the district right next door. For example, in 2000 in Saint Lawrence
County, two towns, Ogdensburg and Gouveneur, included more
than 3,000 incarcerated people as if they were residents for pur-
poses of redistricting.55 Consequently, the residents’ political power
in those two small towns inflated, and the political power of Saint
Lawrence County residents, who did not live near a prison, diluted.
50. The senate districts most disproportionately represented in the New York prison
system are: Brooklyn District 18 representing parts of Bedford Stuyvesant and Red Hook;
Brooklyn District 20 representing parts of Crown Heights and Flatbush; Brooklyn District 19
representing East New York, Brownsville and Canarsie; Brooklyn District 17 representing
Bushwick, Williamsburg and Cypress Hills; Manhattan District 28 representing East Harlem;
Manhattan District 30 representing Harlem; and Bronx District 32 representing the South
Bronx. After the adjustment of the population data in 2011, 13,725 incarcerated individuals
were reallocated to these seven districts. See THE NEW YORK WORLD, CHANGING HOW NEW
YORK COUNTS PRISONERS, http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2012/01/10/redistricting (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015).
51. N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS., supra note 47, at ii (reporting that 49.2% are African Ameri-
can and 24% are Latino).
52. Facility Listing, N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://www.doccs.ny.gov/
faclist.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
53. See id.
54. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER
PRISON TERMS 13 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/www
pewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/PrisonTimeServedpdf.pdf.
55. PETER WAGNER, ET AL., PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, PHANTOM CONSTITUENTS IN THE EM-
PIRE STATE: HOW OUTDATED CENSUS BUREAU METHODOLOGY BURDENS NEW YORK COUNTIES 8
(2007), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/nycounties/nycounties.pdf.
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During the 2000 redistricting cycle in New York, population
figures revealed that each New York State Senate district should
have held approximately 306,000 people—the state population di-
vided by the number of districts.56 Under the “one person, one
vote” principle, if each district has equal population, then each resi-
dent will have the same electoral power as residents elsewhere in
the state.57 But counting people in prison as “residents” of the
prison meant that several districts in New York were padded with
large concentrations of individuals who could not vote. Generally,
states are allowed to draw districts that deviate from the ideal size by
a maximum of ten percent; one district can be five percent below,
and another can be five percent above the ideal size, for a ten per-
cent maximum deviation.58 By at least one analysis, seven New York
State Senate districts would have fallen more than five percent
short of the 306,000 average if the prison population had been re-
moved from those districts during the 2000 redistricting cycle.59
That is, the combined deviations of these districts would have ex-
ceeded the ten percent maximum discretion typically allowed states
in their redistricting.
56. N.Y. State Legislative Task Force on Demographic Research and Reapportionment,
2000 Census Data by District, http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/data/2000files/2000sen-prof.pdf.
57. It should be noted that there are two standards for what is “equal population” for
the purpose of drawing legislative districts: one for congressional districts and the other for
state legislative districts. For congressional districts, the Supreme Court has required equal
population “as nearly as is practicable.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). The
Court has interpreted this to mean that states must make a “good-faith effort to achieve
absolute equality.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preis-
ler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969)). However, the Court has allowed more flexibility for state
legislative districts; they must reflect only “substantial equality of population.” Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964). Generally, this means that the population difference between
the largest and smallest state legislative districts may not be more than ten percent of the
average district population. See Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–43 (1983) (explaining
that “as a general matter, . . . an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation
under 10% falls within th[e] category of minor deviations.”). The different standards for
drawing congressional and state districts arise from different clauses in the U.S. Constitution.
Population disparities for congressional districts are governed by the Apportionments
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Population disparities for state legislative districts are regu-
lated by the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 558–560.
58. See supra note 57.
59. Gerrymandering and relying on the miscount of prisoners combine to violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion in New York, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/nygerryman
der.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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II. RECENT REFORMS
The clearest solution to the imbalance caused by prison-based
gerrymandering is for the Census Bureau to count people who are
in prison as residents of their home communities. With this policy,
the Census Bureau would achieve a more accurate population
count of those home communities, assuring full access to services,
programs, and federal funds. Moreover, this policy would enable
local redistricting officials to design fair, accountable legislative
districts.60
Although the Census Bureau did not change its usual residency
rule as it applies to prisons in 2010, it did make a significant change
in the way it published the population data in 2011. For the first
time, the Census Bureau released the Group Quarters data to the
states earlier in the redistricting cycle.61 Traditionally, the first
counts of people in Group Quarters were not available until the
summer of the year after the census, too late to be useful for redis-
tricting in most states. The deadlines for redistricting vary state-by-
60. It is important to remember that the census tally impacts communities beyond legis-
lative districts. Census population and demographic statistics are used to influence decision-
making at all levels of government, including distributing more than $300 billion in federal
funds, providing housing and new development, planning new schools, libraries and health
care facilities, locating manufacturing and commercial facilities, and improving public trans-
portation and infrastructure. To assure long-term and lasting economic equality, the Census
Bureau should amend its “usual residency” rule to count people in prison as residents of
their home communities throughout the country. In 2013, more than two hundred organiza-
tions signed a letter urging the Census Bureau to conduct the research necessary to ensure
that the 2020 census counts incarcerated people at their home addresses. February 2013 stake-
holder’s letter, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.
org/letters/feb2013.html. In May 2015, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that
the U.S. Census Bureau was “reviewing the 2010 Residence Rule . . . to determine if changes
should be made . . . for the 2020 Census.” 80 Fed. Reg. 28950 (May 20, 2015). The Bureau
solicited public comments on whether any changes should be made to the residence rule,
and noted that it anticipates publishing the final residence rule for the 2020 census in late
2017. Id. A study of the 2010 count of the jail and prison group quarters population recom-
mended that the Census Bureau create a self-enumeration pilot to determine the utility of
prison inmates completing their own census forms. BARBARA OWEN & ANNA CHAN, U.S. CEN-
SUS BUREAU, ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY OF THE GROUP QUARTERS POPULATION IN THE 2010 CENSUS:
JAILS AND PRISONS 37–38 (2013), http://www.census.gov/srd/papers/pdf/ssm2013-13.pdf.
The Owen and Chan study presents a detailed analysis of how the 2010 census was conducted
in two women’s state prisons and in one county jail, with additional information from obser-
vations of the collection of American Community Survey data in a large male state prison and
other facilities. Id. It was not intended to be a review of the feasibility of enumerating incar-
cerated people at alternative addresses, but its review of existing practices and its suggestions
for how those practices could be improved, make it a valuable first step. To be sure, there are
practical challenges to implementing a change in the residency rule, but it is certainly possi-
ble. See ERIKA WOOD, supra note 5, at 24–29; see also OWEN & CHAN, supra, at 37–38.
61. See Robert Groves, So, How Do You Handle Prisons?, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: DIRECTOR’S
BLOG (Mar. 1, 2010), http://directorsblog.blogs.census.gov/2010/03/01/so-how-do-you-han
dle-prisons. For a discussion of Group Quarters see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text.
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state, and within each state there are often different timelines for
state legislative districts and congressional districts. Still, generally
states must draw new districts in time to allow potential candidates
to file their candidacy in the next election cycle. As a result, most
states will draw their new districts in the spring and summer of the
year following the census. In 2000, general redistricting data was
released to the states in March 2001, but the Group Quarters data
was gradually rolled out on a state-by-state basis between June and
August 2001.62 Due to this timing, even states that were aware of the
problems caused by prison-based gerrymandering were unable to
address the problem because they did not have access to the Group
Quarters data when they apportioned their residents for districts.63
The Census Bureau released its 2010 Group Quarters data in
April 2011, significantly earlier than in previous decades.64 This ear-
lier release allowed states and localities that were interested in
adjusting the incarcerated population to access the necessary data.
The Census Director explained the Bureau’s rationale: “This dec-
ade we are releasing early counts of prisoners . . . so that states can
leave the prisoners counted where the prisons are, delete them
from the redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other
locale.”65
The early release of the Group Quarters data allowed states and
localities to reallocate people in prison back to their home commu-
nities during the 2011 redistricting cycle. Since 2010, nine states
have introduced legislation to do just that.66 Of these, six bills are
still pending in Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, and Tennessee.67 Three local redistricting bodies also passed
related resolutions or legislation, and over two hundred localities
actually removed people in prison when redrawing their local gov-
ernment districts in the 2011 redistricting cycle.68
62. Census 2000 Data Products at a Glance, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
population/www/censusdata/c2kproducts.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
63. See Groves, supra note 61; PETER WAGNER, Tools for Using the Advanced Group Quarters
Summary File, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (May 17, 2011), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.
org/news/2011/05/17/agqsf_tools.
64. Groves, supra note 61.
65. Id.
66. Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, and Texas. See Legislation, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.
org/legislation.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
67. Id.
68. Local governments that avoid prison-based gerrymandering, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (July
20, 2015), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/local/.
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In addition, California, Delaware, Maryland, and New York
passed laws to reallocate people in prison back to their home com-
munities.69 California and Delaware will implement their new laws
after the 2020 census, but Maryland and New York completed real-
location in time for the 2011 redistricting cycle.70
A. Maryland: No Representation without Population Act
In April 2010, Maryland’s governor signed into law the No Repre-
sentation without Population Act, H.B. 496.71 Proponents
introduced the bill in February 2010, and it passed into law a few
months later.72 The bill’s Senate sponsor, testifying in support of
the legislation, emphasized the democratic nature of the bill, ex-
plaining that the policy it aimed to change “artificially enhances the
votes of districts with prisons and unfairly dilutes the votes of all
other districts . . . .”73
The No Representation without Population Act requires that, as
a general rule, the population count used to create legislative dis-
tricts for the General Assembly, counties, municipalities, and U.S.
House of Representatives, not include individuals incarcerated in
state or federal correctional facilities or those individuals who were
not residents of the state before their incarceration.74 The legisla-
tion provides:
69. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 21003 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804A (2010);
MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01 (West 2010); N.Y. LEGIS. L. § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney
2011).
70. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 21003 (a)(1) (specifying that the law shall apply “[n]ot sooner
than April 1, 2020, and not later than July 1, 2020 . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804A(c)
(“This section shall not apply to the redistricting of the State following the 2010 federal
decennial census. This section shall apply to the redistricting of the State following each
federal decennial census thereafter.”).
71. Bill Info: House Bill 496, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF MD., http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/
webmga/frmMain.aspx?ys=2010rs%2fbillfile%2fhb0496.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
72. H.B. 496, 2010 Regular Session (Md. 2010).
73. Statement of Sen. Catherine E. Pugh, S.B. 400, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www.
prisonersofthecensus.org/testimony/Sen_Pugh_MD_SB400_March_4_2010.pdf.
74. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 2-2A-01 (West 2010). The Maryland Constitution
requires the Governor to prepare a legislative redistricting plan following the decennial cen-
sus and present the plan to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Delegates. MD. CONST. art. III, § 5. Both houses of the legislature must have the plan intro-
duced as a joint resolution on the first day of the regular session in the second year following
the census. Id. If the legislature does not adopt another redistricting plan by the forty-fifth
day of the session, the Governor’s plan as presented becomes law. Id.
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The population count used after each decennial census for the
purpose of creating the congressional [and legislative] district-
ing plan . . . shall count individuals incarcerated in . . .
correctional facilities . . . at their last known residence before
incarceration . . . .75
1. Implementation
Implementing the new law required the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) to provide the
data necessary to determine the last known address of each pris-
oner.76 DPSCS formed a special team to gather and verify home
address data. To gather the required data, DPSCS first consulted its
own database, which maintains demographic and other informa-
tion concerning inmates housed in Maryland correctional
facilities.77 It forwarded these lists to the correctional facilities
where the inmates were housed so they could be reviewed by prison
staff for accuracy.78 Each correctional facility then completed and
corrected the missing and inaccurate home address fields, relying
on three sources: (1) interviews with inmates; (2) pre-sentence in-
vestigation documents; and (3) correctional facility intake forms.79
DPSCS officials then entered the corrected information into one
database and provided it to the Maryland Department of Planning
(MDP), the agency charged with reallocating the prison
population.80
Once the DPCS database was complete, MDP completed the pro-
cess to remove each inmate from the district where he was
incarcerated and reallocate him back to his or her home address.
75. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. Law § 8-70(a)(2) (2010). The broad language of the legisla-
tion proved troublesome for the Maryland Department of Planning (MDP), the agency
tasked with implementing the new law. To assist in determining exactly what information was
to be used to determine the last known residence, the MDP drafted regulations to guide and
inform its implementation efforts. The focus of these regulations was largely on how to deter-
mine the last known residence by specifying the information that could be relied upon to
reallocate incarcerated individuals to their home communities. See MD. CODE REGS.
34.05.01.01 et seq. (2010).
76. For a detailed, step-by-step explanation of how the New York and Maryland laws
were implemented, see Wood, supra note 5.
77. Combs Decl. ¶ 3–4, Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F.Supp.2d 887 (D. Md. 2011).
78. Id. at ¶ 4.
79. Id. at ¶ 6.
80. Id. at ¶ 6; Telephone Interview with Felicia Hinton, Assistant Comm’r, Md. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. (Mar. 15, 2013).
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This process, known as “geocoding,”81 matched each inmate ad-
dress to a census block and lot. MDP then re-tallied the population
for each block, allowing the legislature to use the adjusted popula-
tion data to create legislative districts with equal population.82
2. A Legal Challenge: Fletcher v. Lamone
On November 10, 2011, the Legacy Foundation, a conservative
Iowa-based advocacy group,83 financed a lawsuit filed in the U.S.
District Court for Maryland, challenging the adjustment process,
the legality of the resulting districts, and the validity of the No Rep-
resentation without Population Act.84 On December 23, 2011, a
three-judge panel85 granted the state’s motion for summary judg-
ment, finding the new law to be constitutional and the
implementation of the law to be proper and nondiscriminatory.86
81. Geocoding is the process of finding associated geographic coordinates from other
data such as a street address. Geocoding takes an address, matches it to a street and specific
segment (usually a “block”), and then inserts the position of the address within that segment.
Once the geographic coordinates are located, the address can be mapped and entered into a
Geographic Information System (GIS) to allow technical staff and policymakers to draw legis-
lative districts. See generally DANIEL W. GOLDBERg, N. AM. ASS’N OF CENT. CANCER REGISTRIES,
INC., A GEOCODING BEST PRACTICES GUIDE (2008), https://www.naaccr.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=ZKekM8k_IQ0%3D&tabid=239&mid=69.
82. The MDP regulations determined that if the agency was unable to geocode the last
known address after making reasonable efforts, then the last known address would be “the
state or federal correctional facility where the individual is incarcerated.” MD. CODE REGS.
34.05.01.04(C)(1) (2010). This is a significant difference between the Maryland and New
York laws. In New York, a person with an unknown address was simply not allocated to any
legislative district, while in Maryland the person would be allocated back to the prison dis-
trict. Id.; N.Y. LEGIS. L. § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2011). The regulations provide examples
of “ungeocodable” addresses, including: no address or an address of “homeless,” address of a
correctional facility, rural route address, post office box, address with no house number,
addresses with multiple errors or no street suffix, and addresses that are incorrect or not
included in the Census Bureaus’ TIGER street centerline file used to geocode addresses. MD.
CODE REGS. 34.05.01.04 (D) (2010).
83. See Annie Linskey, Iowa Group to Fund Suit Against Maryland’s Congressional Map, BAL-
TIMORE SUN (Nov. 10, 2011) http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-redistrict
ing-lawsuit-20111110,0,848688.story; see also Case Filings, LEGACY FOUND., http://legacyfounda
tion.us/case-filings (last visited Sept. 24, 2015). The Legacy Foundation’s stated mission is “to
advance individual liberty, free enterprise and limited, accountable government.” Why the
Legacy Foundation?, LEGACY FOUND., http://legacyfoundation.us/why-the-legacy-foundation
(last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
84. Fletcher v. Lamone, 831 F.Supp.2d 887, 890 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 29
(2012) (mem.).
85. The case was heard by a three-judge panel under 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). Id. That sec-
tion provides for a three-judge panel to decide any action that challenges the
constitutionality of the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.
86. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp.2d at 910.
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The primary basis for the plaintiffs’ challenge was that Mary-
land’s adjustment to the census data under the No Representation
without Population Act violated the “one person, one vote” princi-
ple established by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims.87
Essentially, plaintiffs argued that by adjusting the census data to re-
allocate people in prison back to their home communities,
Maryland ignored the instructions of the Supreme Court in Karcher
v. Daggett that census data is “the only basis for good-faith attempts
to achieve population equality.”88 The court rejected plaintiffs’ ar-
gument, explaining that although the Supreme Court did require
states to use census data “as a starting point,”89 the Court did not
hold that states could not modify census data “to correct perceived
flaws.”90 Citing Karcher, the Maryland Federal District Court clari-
fied that if a state attempts to correct census figures, “it may not do
so in a haphazard, inconsistent, or conjectural manner.”91 The
court then concluded that Karcher suggests that “a State may choose
to adjust the census data, so long as those adjustments are thor-
oughly documented and applied in a nonarbitrary fashion and they
otherwise do not violate the Constitution.”92 It noted that its conclu-
sion that states can adjust census data during redistricting is also
“consistent with the practices of the Census Bureau,” explaining
that according to the Bureau, “prisoners are counted where they
are incarcerated for pragmatic and administrative reasons, not legal
ones.”93 Finally, the court determined that Maryland’s adjustments
to the census data were done “in the systematic manner” required
by Karcher.94
Additionally, the plaintiffs raised two objections to the Maryland
law itself. First, they argued that if Maryland wished to correct inac-
curacies in its population resulting from allocation of prisoners, it
must also adjust for inaccuracies created by college students and
members of the military. Second, they insisted that most prisoners
do not return to their last known address after release.95
The court dismissed both arguments. First, the court noted that
plaintiffs’ argument “implie[d] that college students, soldiers, and
prisoners are similarly situated groups,” an assumption the court
87. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
88. 464 U.S. 725, 738 (1983); see also Fletcher, 831 F.Supp.2d at 894.
89. Fletcher, 831 F. Supp.2d at 894.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 894 (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 464 U.S. 725, 732 n.4 (1983)).
92. Id. at 894–95.
93. Id. at 895.
94. Id. at 896.
95. Id.
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deemed “questionable at best.”96 The court observed that “[c]ollege
students and members of the military are eligible to vote” and that
they “have the liberty to interact with members of the surrounding
community and to engage fully in civic life.”97 The court concluded,
“[B]oth groups have a much more substantial connection to, and
effect on, the communities where they reside than do prisoners.”98
On the second point, the court determined that “it would cer-
tainly be true that at least some prisoners will return to their home
communities . . . ,” citing an Urban Institute study finding that most
Maryland prisoners returned to Baltimore after their release from
prison.99 The court concluded that “some correction is better than
no correction” and that the adjusted data would “be more accurate
than the information contained in the initial census report which
[did] not take prisoners’ community ties into account at all.”100
In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ma-
ryland District Court in a memorandum disposition.101 Maryland’s
law and the 2011 adjustment to the incarcerated population were
upheld.
B. New York Law: Part XX
On August 11, 2010, Part XX of Chapter 57 of the Laws of 2010
(Part XX) became law.102 Part XX directed the New York State Leg-
islative Task Force on Demographic Research and
Reapportionment (LATFOR) to reallocate people in correctional
facilities back to their home communities for purposes of drawing




99. Id. (citing NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, A PORTRAIT OF PRISONER
REENTRY IN MARYLAND 39 (2003), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publi-
cation-pdfs/410655-A-Portrait-of-Prisoner-Reentry-in-Maryland.pdf)
100. Id. at 897.
101. 133 S. Ct. 29 (2012) (mem.).  The case was appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1253, which allows direct appeal of any order granting or
denying an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action determined by a three-
judge district court.
102. Assemb. B. A09710-D, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010).
103. New York law designates LATFOR as the body responsible for the “preparation and
formulation of a reapportionment plan . . . [and] the utilization of census and other demo-
graphic and statistical data for policy analysis, program development and program evaluation
purposes for the legislature.” N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(3) (McKinney 2011). The task force is
bipartisan and consists of six members, two whom are appointed by the state Senate presi-
dent, two of whom are appointed by the speaker of the Assembly and one each appointed by
the minority leaders of the Senate and Assembly. Id. § 83-m(2). Four task force members are
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No doubt the title of the law, Part XX, sparks some curiosity. It
comes from its designation as Part XX of the annual state budget.
Critics long ago labeled Albany the most dysfunctional legislature
in the country, notorious for its lack of transparency, closed-door
dealings, and failure to engage with the public.104 The passage of
Part XX only reinforced this (dis)reputation.
Over the years, legislators repeatedly introduced the bill to real-
locate people in prison back to their home communities. But
because of its assumed political implications, particularly for up-
state Republicans who had long controlled the state Senate, the
legislation never advanced. Then came the summer of 2010. For
the first time in four decades, Democrats controlled both houses of
the legislature and the governor’s office. The 2011 redistricting cy-
cle was fast approaching. The bill’s longtime champion, then state
Senator Eric Schneiderman, was running for state Attorney Gen-
eral. With the budget 125 days past due, the legislature feared
setting a new record (and no doubt members were eager to take
their August vacations). The pressure was on to get the bill on the
governor’s desk. The budget finally passed at 8:30 PM on August 3,
with no public debate and not a single Republican vote.105 Part XX
was buried deep inside, and included language identical to
Schneiderman’s most recently proposed legislation, Senate Bill
6725A.106
Part XX directed the New York State Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to deliver various data con-
cerning each individual in its custody to the redistricting taskforce
(LATFOR), including the residential address of the person prior to
members of the legislature and two are not. Id. The New York legislature has primary respon-
sibility for drawing the state’s congressional and state legislative lines. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4.
While LATFOR recommends congressional and state legislative plans to the legislature, the
legislature is free to amend or even ignore its proposals. See N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m (McKin-
ney 2011). New York law does not impose a particular deadline for drawing congressional or
state legislative lines, but in practice district lines must be final in time to allow candidates to
meet the filing deadlines for the next primary election. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-158 (McKinney
2015).
104. See generally JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: AN EVALUATION AND BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM
(2004), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/albanyreform_finalre
port.pdf; LAWRENCE NORDEN, DAVID E. POZEN, & BETHANY L. FOSTER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUS-
TICE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM (2006), http://www.bren
nancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_37893.pdf; ANDREW STENGEL,
LAWRENCE NORDEN, & LAURA SEAGO, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STILL BROKEN: NEW YORK
STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM 2008 UPDATE (2009), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/de-
fault/files/legacy/publications/Still.Broken.pdf.
105. Danny Hakim, 125 Days Late, A State Budget with New Taxes NEW YORK TIMES (Aug 4,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/nyregion/04albany.html?_r=0.
106. See S. 6725A (N.Y. 2010), http://open.nysenate.gov/legislation/bill/S6725A-2009.
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incarceration.107 Part XX also required LATFOR, upon receipt of
this information from DOCCS, to determine the census block “cor-
responding to the street address of each [incarcerated] person’s
residential address prior to incarceration” and the census block
“corresponding to the street address of the correctional facility.”108
The new law then directed LATFOR to create “a database in which
all incarcerated persons shall be . . . allocated for redistricting pur-
poses, such that each geographic unit reflects incarcerated
populations at their respective residential addresses prior to incar-
ceration rather than at the addresses of [the] correctional
facilities.”109 Part XX requires LATFOR to maintain the amended
population dataset and use the dataset to draw state assembly and
senate districts.110 The law also required LATFOR to make the ad-
justed population data available to localities for county and
municipal redistricting.111 At least twelve counties and New York
107. N.Y. CORRECTS. LAW § 71(8)(a) (McKinney 2011). Interestingly, Article III, section 4
the New York State Constitution provides that, for the purpose of voting, “no person shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a residence, by reason of his or her presence or absence . . .
while confined in any public prison.”
108. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2011).
109. Id.
110. Id. In contrast to the Maryland law, under Part XX all individuals with out-of-state or
unknown pre-incarceration addresses, and all individuals incarcerated in federal correctional
facilities, would be “counted at an address unknown” and not included in the redistricting
dataset. Id. Whereas in Maryland these individuals would be allocated to the prison district,
in New York they were “subtracted” from the prison district, but not reallocated to a home
district. In effect, they were not “counted” for redistricting purposes. The choice to not real-
locate people in federal prisons reflected concerns about the privacy laws that govern federal
facilities and the lack of state authority over those in federal custody. The Privacy Act of
1974 regulates what personal information the Federal Government can collect about private
individuals and how that information can be used. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1996), et seq. While
there is concern that federal prisons may be restricted from disclosing personal records, even
if the records do not include personally identifiable information, it is also clear that at least
one state—Kansas—has a long history of successful cooperation between federal and state
agencies. Kansas reallocates people living on military bases for redistricting, and the U.S.
military has worked with the state to collect and share home residence data for people living
on military bases in the state. See KRIS W. KOBACH, KAN. SEC’Y OF STATE, ADJUSTMENT TO THE
2010 U.S. DECENNIAL CENSUS 4–5 (2011), https://www.kssos.org/forms/elections/2010Cen-
susAdj.pdf.
111. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2011). Part XX also amended the Munici-
pal Home Rule Law to provide that for purposes of establishing a population base for local
government’s plan of apportionment, “ ‘population’ shall mean residents, citizens, or regis-
tered voters.” N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(ii)(a)(13)(c) (McKinney 2011). The law
then clarified that “[f]or such purposes, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost
residence, or to have become a resident of a local government . . . by reason of being subject
to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections and community supervision and present
in a state correctional facility pursuant to such jurisdiction.” Id.
FALL 2015] One Significant Step 199
City used the adjusted population data when creating their 2011
districts.112
1. A Legal Challenge: Little v. LATFOR
On April 4, 2011, a group of upstate Republican state senators—
all of whom represented districts that included at least one New
York state prison—and a handful of voters who lived in those dis-
tricts, filed a lawsuit against LATFOR and DOCCS. They argued
that Part XX was unconstitutional and asked the court to enjoin the
agencies from implementing it.113 Plaintiffs asserted that the new
law violated Article III, section 4 of the New York State Constitu-
tion, which provides that the federal census “shall be controlling as
to the number of inhabitants in the state or any part thereof for the
purpose of apportionment of members of assembly and readjust-
ment or alteration of senate and assembly districts.”114 The
Complaint alleged that Part XX was unconstitutional because it
“creat[ed] a structural change by an artificial realignment of politi-
cal power in the State.”115
On December 1, 2011, on cross motions for summary judgment,
the New York State Supreme Court in Albany County upheld the
new law.116 The court relied in part on the new census policy of
releasing the Group Quarters data early to allow states to enact re-
districting plans that allocate prisoners to their pre-incarceration
locations. It found that plaintiffs had not demonstrated that Part
XX “rendered the data provided by the Census Bureau to be any-
thing less than ‘controlling’ in the redistricting process.”117 The
112. PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, supra note 68, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/local.
The New York City Districting Commission states on its website: “The NYC Districting Com-
mission will be using LATFOR prisoner-adjusted data for districting purposes.” Resources,
N.Y. CITY DISTRICTING COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dc/html/links/links.shtml (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015).
113. Complaint ¶¶ 1, 12–21, Little v. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 4,
2011).
114. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4.
115. Complaint at ¶ 86, LATFOR, No. 2310-2011. Numerous voting rights and civil rights
groups which had advocated for the reforms in Part XX intervened on behalf of the state
defendants, representing voters from both upstate and downstate communities. The voters
who intervened represented different interests, including: (1) those who lived in districts
with high numbers of incarcerated individuals; (2) those who lived in both upstate and down-
state counties that did not contain a prison; and (3) those who lived in a county where a
prison was located but whose vote would nevertheless be diluted if the lawsuit prevailed be-
cause their local county legislative districts did not contain a prison. Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Intervene at 2–3, LATFOR, No. 2310-2011.
116. LATFOR, No. 2310-2011.
117. Id. at 6–7.
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court further explained that there was nothing in the record indi-
cating that people in prison “have any actual permanency in these
locations or have an intent to remain. . . . [P]laintiffs have not prof-
fered evidence that inmates have substantial ties to the
communities in which they are involuntarily and temporarily
located.”118
2. Implementation
In 2011, prior to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby
County, Ala. v. Holder,119 New York submitted Part XX to the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) for “preclearance” under sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act because the law constituted a
change to voting laws and procedures.120 Due to past discrimination
against language minorities, Bronx, Kings, and New York counties
were “covered jurisdictions” under section 5, required to seek DOJ
approval before implementing any changes to their voting laws or
procedures.121
In its preclearance submission, the New York Attorney General’s
office explained that Part XX would “directly benefit[ ]” minority
voters protected by section 5 because those incarcerated in New
York state prisons “originate predominantly from urban districts . . .
subject to § 5, and are incarcerated in non-covered jurisidic-
tions.”122 The submission concluded that Part XX would
118. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs’ attempt to appeal directly to the New York Court of Appeals was
denied, and they chose not to appeal the Supreme Court’s decision to the mid-level appellate
court. Little v. LAFTOR, SSD 3 (N.Y. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2012) (mem.).
119. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
120. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2006). As a result of the 2013 Supreme Court ruling in Shelby
County, Ala. v. Holder, 113 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) striking down the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance coverage formula, New York is no longer required to pre-clear changes to its
voting laws.
121. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2006). See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-voting-rights-act (“In addition, the 1965
definition of ‘test or device’ was expanded to include the practice of providing election infor-
mation, including ballots, only in English in states or political subdivisions where members of
a single language minority constituted more than five percent of the citizens of voting age.
This third formula had the effect of covering Alaska, Arizona, and Texas in their entirety,
and parts of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota.”);
see also Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 (last visited Sept. 24, 2014) (listing Bronx,
Kings and New York counties).
122. Letter from Joel Graber, Special Litigation Counsel, N. Y. State Att’y Gen. to Chris-
tian Herren Jr., Chief, Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.pri
sonersofthecensus.org/little/NYS-Sec5-partxx-submission.pdf.
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“appropriately adjust the weight of the vote of members of pro-
tected classes in New York’s three § 5 counties . . . .”123 DOJ granted
preclearance on May 9, 2011, finding that the state carried its bur-
den of establishing that Part XX was free of any discriminatory
effect or intent.124 Subsequently, New York moved forward with im-
plementation in time for the 2011 redistricting cycle
The data DOCCS provided to LATFOR in compliance with Part
XX included several fields of address information for each incarcer-
ated person. While the legislation required DOCCS to provide each
inmate’s “residential address prior to incarceration,”125 DOCCS in-
terpreted this broadly. The information it provided included each
inmate’s “legal residence address,” address at time of arrest, and
the address of the inmate’s parents, spouse (if any), and nearest
relative.126
LATFOR undertook a process to check each home address pro-
vided by DOCCS, remove each incarcerated person from his prison
district, and reallocate him back to his home address.127 Ultimately,
LATFOR assigned geographic coordinates for the addresses of
46,003 incarcerated individuals to 24,245 unique census blocks
statewide.128
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF NEW YORK AND MARYLAND LAWS
NEW YORK MARYLAND
Applies to state legislative YES YESdistricts?
Applies to congressional NO YESdistricts?
Applies to local districts? YES YES
Applies to state prisons? YES YES
123. Id.
124. Letter from T. Christian Herren, Jr., Chief, Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to
Joel Graber, Special Litigation Counsel, N.Y. State Att’y Gen. (May 9, 2011), http://www.
prisonersofthecensus.org/little/doj_preclearance_letter.pdf.
125. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2011).
126. Relocating Prisoners to Home Community Addresses at 2 (N.Y. State Assembly, Sept. 2011).
127. For a detailed, step-by-step explanation of how the New York and Maryland laws
were implemented, see WOOD, supra note 5.
128. Memorandum from Isaac Fefer, Senior Demographer, Bruce Ruiz, GIS Manager &
Marisa Vallve´, Senior GIS Analyst to Debra A. Levine & Lewis M. Hoppe, Co-Executive Direc-
tors, N.Y. State Legis. Task Force on Demographic Research & Reapportionment 4 (Jan. 5,
2012), http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/justice2012/senate1/Exhibits/007Joint%20Exhibit%20
7%20—%20Prisoner%20Allocation%20Documents/0_ReadMe.pdf.
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NEW YORK MARYLAND
YES for
subtractionApplies to federal prisons? YESNO for
reallocation
Specifies implementing YES NOagency?
Directs correctional system YES NOto provide specific data?
YES– allocated toOut-of-state and unknown NO– excluded correctionaladdresses allocated? from dataset facility
III. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK AND MARYLAND LAWS
Once officials crunched the data and finally drew legislative
maps, the inevitable question became: “What changed?” Inspecting
the state legislative district lines reveals that, actually, very little
changed in that regard. In New York, Republicans did not lose up-
state districts, and Democrats did not gain downstate districts.
Republicans continue to hold the majority in the Senate; Demo-
crats continue to hold the majority in the Assembly.129 Similarly, in
Maryland, Baltimore did not gain Democratic districts, and Mary-
land rural areas did not lose Republican districts. To the
disappointment of Democratic lawmakers who pushed for the legis-
lation and the relief of Republicans who opposed it, eliminating
prison-based gerrymandering did not have a partisan impact.
However, even though the new laws did not affect the number of
legislative districts, there is reason to believe that they did have a
real impact in correcting the dilution of the voting strength of re-
sidents of the home communities. The districting impact of these
laws was at the local level, likely correcting a skew that had existed
for decades under the census policy.
A. Minimal Partisan Impact
In New York, the net loss of upstate residents after the realloca-
tion of incarcerated individuals was about twelve percent of a single
129. Jesse McKinley, In Rebuke to Democrats, Voters Return Control of New York Senate to G.O.P
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/nyregion/with-early-re-
sults-republicans-hover-close-to-control-of-new-york-senate.html.
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district when the Senate comprised sixty-two districts, or 38,404 re-
sidents.130 The net gain downstate was 20,112 residents.131 By at
least one analysis, the reallocation of incarcerated individuals re-
sulted in two upstate Senate districts having populations below the
required threshold to remain viable.132 Since the 2000 census, the
population of the New York City area has grown, while the upstate
population has shrunk slightly. This decrease in population was
augmented by the reallocation of people in prison.133
As a result of demographic changes over the last decade, several
districts in upstate New York fell below the legal minimum popula-
tion for a sixty-two-seat Senate after the 2010 census. Although the
story remains somewhat murky, it appears that New York Senate
Republicans proposed adding a sixty-third Senate district.134 By ad-
ding a sixty-third seat, every other Senate district would have to
become smaller, thus reversing the loss of residents from the pris-
oner reallocation and protecting the Republicans’ one-seat Senate
majority. LATFOR agreed to the proposal and its final Senate plan
included sixty-three districts.135 Democrats challenged the addi-
tional district, but the New York Supreme Court ultimately upheld
it.136 The court commented that while the new district was not un-
constitutional, the legislature’s apportionment methodology was
“disturbing.”137
There is less analysis available regarding Maryland’s districts, but
it appears that the reallocation had minimal political impact there
as well.138 District 2B in Washington County, where Maryland Cor-
rectional Institution-Hagerstown is located, lost 5,386 prisoners, or
just over three percent of its population.139 About 8,000 residents
130. Sasha Chavkin & Michael Keller, Proposed 63rd Senate Seat Would Negate Impact of





134. See Adam Shanks, LATFOR Releases Proposed Senate and Assembly District Maps, LEGISLA-
TIVE GAZETTE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.legislativegazette.com/Articles-Top-Stories-c-2012-
01-26-81252.113122-LATFOR-releases-proposed-Senate-and-Assembly-district-maps.html.
135. See View District Maps, LATFOR, http://www.latfor.state.ny.us/maps/?sec=2012s (last
visited Sept. 24, 2015); see also Shanks, supra note 134.
136. Cohen v. Cuomo, 945 N.Y.S.2d 857, 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
137. Id. at 862.
138. For a discussion of the impact of the new law on Maryland’s districts see Michelle
Davis, Assessing the Constitutionality of Adjusting Prisoner Census Data in Congressional Redistrict-
ing: Maryland’s Test Case, 43 U. BALT. LAW FORUM 35, 48 (2012).
139. Maggie Clark, Could a Recount of Prisoners Affect Elections?, STATELINE (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2012/10/12/could-a-
recount-of-prisoners-affect-elections.
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were reallocated to Baltimore, helping offset its population
decline.140
Thus, eliminating prison-based gerrymandering did not signifi-
cantly impact the size of state legislative districts or shift the
political control of either state. After all, legislators in both states
have many tools available to design districts to their own liking; it
turns out that reallocating the prison population, a relatively small
portion of the overall population of the state, is not a particularly
effective method to impact the design of state and congressional
districts.141 This realization should dampen the political opposition
to reforming these laws. However, despite the lack of statewide par-
tisan impact, these reforms do have important results for the local
communities in New York City and Baltimore.
B. Correcting Vote Dilution
The greater impact of the New York and Maryland laws was on
the local level. Because large numbers of incarcerated individuals
were reallocated to a few distinct urban neighborhoods in both
New York City and Baltimore, the impact of the reallocation was
heavily concentrated in certain city council districts in both cities.
Because of high incarceration rates, these same neighborhoods lost
significantly more residents than other districts within the city for
decades prior to the reallocation.
For example, about one-third of the total prison population real-
located under Part XX in New York, totaling about 13,724 people,
returned to eight New York City neighborhoods: Bedford Stuyve-
sant, Crown Heights, Flatbush, East New York, Brownsville,
Bushwick, Harlem, and the South Bronx.142 In Maryland, although
the overall numbers are smaller, the concentrated impact on cer-
tain Baltimore neighborhoods is similar to New York.
Approximately forty-five percent of all incarcerated individuals real-
located to home addresses in Maryland were reallocated to
140. Id.
141. For a thorough explanation of redistricting and gerrymandering techniques, see JUS-
TIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING (2009); see also
JEFF GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING (2d ed. 2010); Nat’l Con-
ference of State Legislators, REDISTRICTING LAW 2010; Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering &
Political Cartels, 116 HARVARD L. REV. 594 (2002); Nathan Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding
Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARVARD L.
REV. 649 (2002).
142. Redistricting Prisons, N.Y. WORLD, http://public.thenewyorkworld.com/public/2012/
jan/redistricting-prisons/index-expand.html (last visited. 24, 2015).
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Baltimore City.143 Of the incarcerated individuals reallocated to Bal-
timore City, more than half returned to City Council Districts 6, 7,
8, and 9, which make up the area of West Baltimore.144
Losing residents means losing political power. Like all legislative
districts, city council districts must be drawn to include the same
number of residents, but this is necessarily a smaller number for
municipal districts than for state legislative districts. The smaller
size of municipal districts means the prisoner reallocation has a
greater impact on the local level. When inmates were allocated to
the prison district, their home districts likely had to expand their
boundaries in order to bring the population numbers up to the
level needed to create a viable district. This expansion likely
brought in residents of neighboring communities, diluting the rela-
tive voting power of each resident of the original district.
In New York City and Baltimore, where very different urban
neighborhoods often sit right up against each other, the expansion
of district lines could bring in residents from a community that has
interests quite different from those of a community with a high con-
centration of incarcerated residents. Residents may have widely
divergent experiences within their communities, including where
their children attend school, whether they use public transporta-
tion, whether they live in public housing, and whether they receive
public assistance. Moreover, how the community interacts with and
experiences the criminal justice system varies depending on
whether it is a community with a high number of incarcerated re-
sidents or a less affected neighboring community. These
differences between bordering neighborhoods may be due in large
part to the racial demographics of each area.
For example, New York City Council District 6 consists mostly of
the Upper West Side; it borders District 7, which is comprised
143. See MARYLAND DEP’T OF PLANNING, 2010 ADJUSTED CENSUS POPULATION FOR MARYLAND
BY COUNTY AND REGION, http://www.mdp.state.md.us/PDF/Redistricting/2010docs/Adj_
2010_Tot_Pop_by_MDCntyReg.pdf (Total people reallocated: 16,988; Total reallocated to
Baltimore City: 7,797). Note that there seems to be a discrepancy in the total number if
incarcerated individuals reallocated to Baltimore. The Maryland Department of Planning
reports 7,797 people were reallocated to Baltimore City. But the Baltimore City Council’s
final “Demographic Summary by District” states that 5,703 incarcerated individuals were in-
cluded in the final population data. BALTIMORE CITY COUNCIL, DEMOGRAPHIC SUMMARY BY
DISTRICT: BILL 11-642 AMENDED (2011), http://www.baltimorecitycouncil.com/Redistricting
%202011/Final%20Bill%20Demographic%20Summary%20by%20District.pdf.
144. Id. West Baltimore is approximately ninety percent African American; 31.9% of the
population lives below the poverty line. West Baltimore Neighborhood in Baltimore Maryland De-
tailed Profile, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/West-Baltimore-Baltimore-
MD.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).
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largely of Harlem.145 The two districts share a border, but have dif-
ferent communities with different interests and concerns.146 In
2011, Harlem received about 2,240 incarcerated residents after im-
plementation of Part XX; the Upper West Side received about two
hundred.147 Prior to Part XX, without these incarcerated residents,
the line separating District 7 from District 6 would likely have
moved south. This would pull additional Upper West Side residents
into the Harlem district, bringing the district up to the required
population. This likely would dilute the voting strength of that Har-
lem community. Although the final data of how these residents
were allocated within District 7 is not available, it is likely that incar-
cerated residents caused that southern border to move further
north, so that District 7 more accurately reflects the Harlem com-
munity. This shift likely corrects the dilution of the Harlem
community’s voting strength caused by the failure to include incar-
cerated residents in prior redistricting cycles.
Similarly, City Council District 9 in West Baltimore received
1,032 residents back after the implementation of the No Represen-
tation without Population law.148 District 9 has a population that is
eighty-seven percent African American with thirty-eight percent of
residents living below the poverty level.149 District 9 includes a large
portion of the Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood (the rest of
which spreads across the district line to City Council District 7), the
neighborhood where Freddie Gray grew up and ultimately died
while in police custody.150 The neighborhood was one of the areas
where violent protests took place in April 2015 after his death. Life
expectancy in Sandtown-Winchester is 69.7 years, (on par with Iraq
and Kazakhstan, according to the New York Times).151 According to
the 2010 census, the area was ninety-seven percent black; more
145. NYC Districting Comm’n, NYC Council Districts Revised Plan (Feb. 6, 2013), http://
www.nyc.gov/html/dc/downloads/pdf/Manhattan_Feb6.pdf.
146. In 2000, prior to Part XX, District 6 was seventy-three percent white, six percent
black, and eleven percent Hispanic. Table SF1-DP CNCLD: Demographic Profile—2003 New
York City Council Districts 2000 and 2010, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/census/cen-
sus2010/t_sf1_dp_cncld.pdf. District 7 was thirteen percent white, thirty-one percent black,
and fifty percent Hispanic. Id.
147. Redistricting Prisons, supra note 142.
148. Id.
149. West Baltimore Neighborhood in Baltimore, supra note 144.
150. Scott Shane, Baltimore Riots Are Another Scar on a City Long Battered by Neglect, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/29/us/baltimore-riots-are-anoth
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than half the households had incomes less than $25,000; and just
six percent of adults had a bachelor’s degree or more.152 Unem-
ployment was double the city average.153 In addition, Sandtown-
Winchester has the highest incarceration rate in the state. Three
percent of the total neighborhood population, or 458 residents,
were incarcerated on Census Day 2010.154
District 11, which borders District 9, received 386 incarcerated
residents back.155 It has a population that is eighty-three percent
white with twenty-five percent living below the poverty level.156 As
with the example of Harlem and the Upper West Side, although the
precise data showing where inmates were reallocated on the local
level is not available, it is plausible that the addition of over 1,000
residents to District 9 shrunk the border with District 11, reversing
the dilution of District 9 voters.
This concept of vote dilution has long been recognized as violat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause, which protects the principle of
“one person, one vote.” In Reynolds v. Sims, the 1964 Supreme Court
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require the “one per-
son, one vote” rule. The Court determined that Article I, section 2
of the Constitution, which requires representatives to be chosen “by
the People of the several States,” means that one person’s vote in an
election must be worth the same as every other person’s vote.157
The Court held that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a de-
basement or a dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise.”158
While “vote denial” claims address the disenfranchisement of an
individual voter, vote dilution is about the interests of groups com-
ing together to elect a representative of choice. In essence, the “one
person, one vote” rule is about group power; its purpose and effect
are about whether and how a group of people will be able to elect
152. BALTIMORE CITY DEP’T OF PLANNING, BALTIMORE NEIGHBORHOOD PROFILES: DATA
FROM THE 2000 CENSUS, 2010 CENSUS, AND 2006–2010 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (Apr. 28,
2014), https://baltimore2006to2010acsprofiles.wordpress.com/.
153. See id.
154. JUSTICE POLICY INST. & PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, supra note 36, at 18; see also Justin
Fenton, Report: Sandtown-Winchster Leads State in Number of People Incarcerated, THE BALTIMORE
SUN, (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-
baltimore- -report-20150224-story.html.
155. BALTIMORE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 143.
156. MORRELL PARK NEIGHBORHOOD DETAILED PROFILE, CITY-DATA, http://www.city-data.
com/neighborhood/Morrell-Park-Baltimore-MD.html (last visited Sept. 24 2015).
157. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56–61 (1964).
158. Id. at 555.
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representatives.159 “One person, one vote” claims are about the in-
terests of groups of people who live within a certain geographic
area in securing democratic representation in proportion to their
numbers.160 As the Court explained in Reynolds, “overvaluation of
the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution . . . of
the votes of those living there.”161
By reallocating incarcerated residents back to their home dis-
tricts, the laws in Maryland and New York represent a significant
step in returning political power to inner-city communities whose
voice has long been weakened and diluted by the intersection of
the Census and mass incarceration. Perhaps it was not the seismic
partisan shift that the legislators anticipated, but democracy is not
always about politics.
159. Joseph Fishkin, Weightless Votes, 121 YALE L.J. 1888, 1892–93 (2012).
160. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555; see also Fishkin, supra note 159, at 1899. The correction of
vote dilution in Baltimore and New York City that resulted from the reallocation of the
prison population was quite different from a traditional racial minority vote dilution claim
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2006). Under section 2
and Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56–58 (1986), a vote dilution claim arises when a legis-
lative district has the effect of denying racial minority voters the opportunity to elect a
candidate of their choice. While no section 2 claim has been brought to challenge districts
created under prison-based gerrymandering laws, some voting rights experts have argued
that such a claim may be viable. See Dale E. Ho, Captive Constituents: Prison-Based Gerrymander-
ing and the Current Redistricting Cycle, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 387–88 (2011); NAACP-
LDF, CAPTIVE CONSTITUENTS: PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING AND THE DISTORTION OF DEMOC-
RACY (2010), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/Captive%20Constituents%20Re
port.pdf. Moreover, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals essentially invited consideration of
such a claim on two separate occasions. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 328–29 (2d Cir.
2006) (en banc) (remanding for consideration of a possible claim, stating “[i]t is unclear
whether plaintiffs’ vote dilution claim [challenging New York’s felony disenfranchisement
law] also encompasses a claim on behalf of plaintiffs who are neither incarcerated nor on
parole, that their votes are ‘diluted’ because of New York’s apportionment process . . . which
counts incarcerated prisoners as residents of the communities in which they are incarcerated,
and has the alleged effect of increasing upstate New York regions’ populations at the expense
of New York City’s.”); see also Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 823 (2d Cir. 1995).
161. 377 U.S. at 563. Currently there are cases pending in both Rhode Island and Florida
that challenge the application of the census usual residency rule under a “one person, one
vote” theory. In Rhode Island, voters and the ACLU challenged the 2012 redistricting plan of
the City of Cranston that included the 3,433 incarcerated individuals housed at the Adult
Correctional Institution (ACI). Davidson v. Cranston, 42 F. Supp.3d 325, 326 (R.I. 2014).
The court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding “[i]t is not clear from the informa-
tion available to the Court at this juncture . . . that the prisoners at the ACI’s inclusion in
Ward Six furthers the Constitutional goals of either representational or electoral equality.”
Id. at 332. In Florida, plaintiffs challenged the 2013 redistricting plan of the Jefferson County
Board of Commissioners, arguing that the population of the local prison constitutes nearly
forty percent of the population of one district in the plan. Complaint, Calvin v. Jefferson Cty.
Bd. Of Comm’rs, No. 4:15-cv-00131-MW-CAS (Mar. 9, 2015).
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C. Rebuilding the Building Blocks
The vote dilution caused by prison based gerrymandering laws
illustrates an important element of the harm that occurs when the
criminal justice system intrudes upon our democratic systems.
While the common perception is that our democracy is based on
the right to vote—an individual right, exercised alone, in the isola-
tion of a private voting booth—the reality is that our democracy is
equally based on groups of people coming together. Our represen-
tation before the government relies on whether a group of “We the
People” has collected itself into a community with sufficient num-
bers to warrant representation. As Justice Harlan explained, “the
fundamental principle of representative government in this country
is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people . . . .”162
A legislative district is the mechanism used to identify and acknowl-
edge a community that merits representation in our government.
The district lines define the group and its common interests and
values as they are to be represented in the policymaking process of
the legislative body. In this way, districts are the building blocks that
form the foundation of our representative democracy.
Mass incarceration manipulates these building blocks of group
power, and in doing so weakens our democracy. Incarceration
removes people from their communities, a displacement that is
both physical and legal. People who are arrested, convicted and
sentenced to prison are physically removed from their home com-
munities and relocated to another. In addition to their physical
displacement, incarcerated individuals are simultaneously legally
displaced from the political process through laws that deny the
right to vote to people in prison. The group left behind—a group
that once had numbers meriting democratic representation of a
collective voice—gradually dwindles, not through its own choice,
decision or exercise of free will, but through the forcible removal of
its members. The Census Bureau’s current application of the usual
residency rule to incarcerated individuals permits and sanctions
this manipulation.
This manipulation of group power undermines the fundamental
principle of democratic representation in our country—not only
the representation of the two million Americans who are incarcer-
ated but also the millions of Americans who remain in the
communities that have been disproportionately impacted by the
criminal justice system. These communities should be equal build-
ing blocks, deserving equal representation. Yet because they have
162. Id. at 560–61.
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lost so many members of their community to prison, they are not
equal.
The implementation of the Maryland and New York laws re-
quired each state to create a link between each incarcerated person
and his or her home community. Through the technical steps of
information gathering, data analysis, geocoding, and finally the
drawing of new district lines, each state began to rebuild the build-
ing blocks of democratic representation. In this way, the new laws in
Maryland and New York are about democracy, not politics. They
are a recognition that elected officials represent the collective voice
of group power. And they are an attempt to take one significant
step to reverse the effects of years of the criminal justice system’s
manipulation of this collective voice.
IV. CONCLUSION
In addition to these democratic reforms, the reallocation of peo-
ple in prison back to their home communities could mark an
important philosophical shift in our criminal justice policies. On its
face, incarceration punishes those who commit crimes in our soci-
ety. It is carried out by administrative government bureaucracies
tasked with processing and housing those charged with and con-
victed of crimes. But it is also “an expression of state power, a
statement of collective morality.”163 As David Garland has observed:
Punishment is an embodiment of current sensibilities, and a
set of symbols which display a cultural ethos and help create a
social identity . . . . What appears on its surface to be merely a
means of dealing with offenders so that the rest of us can lead
our lives untroubled by them, is in fact a social institution
which helps define the nature of our society, [and] the kinds
of relationships which compose it . . . .164
New laws in Maryland and New York created a technical link be-
tween the incarcerated individual and his or her community,
resting upon a recognition of the continuing relationship between
incarcerated individuals and their home communities. This recog-
nition seems to signal a shift away from a view of incarceration as a
permanent end in itself and towards a view that recognizes that in-
carceration is temporary. Rather than viewing the goal of
163. DAVID GARLAND, supra note 7, at 287.
164. Id.
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incarceration as isolation and separation, this view seems to recog-
nize broadly that incarcerated individuals are people who maintain
ties to real communities to which most will return upon release. A
criminal justice system that understands and values this connection
between individual and community will hopefully begin to see its
goal as rehabilitation and reintegration rather than isolation and
punishment.
Indeed, there is a growing national conversation about the need
to reform our criminal justice policies. The recent disturbing and
very public deaths of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, Eric
Garner in Staten Island, New York, Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Ma-
ryland, Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio, and Walter Scott in
Charleston, South Carolina, all at the hands of police officers, have
focused attention on the relationship between police and minority
communities.
The immediate attention on policing in minority communities
has opened a broader national discussion recognizing the larger
impact of mandatory minimum sentences, mass incarceration, and
race and poverty in cities across the country; a conversation that is
long overdue. Indeed, the United States Department of Justice and
President Obama have made strong and honest statements about
the harm mass incarceration has caused to minority communities,
and about the continuing racial bias that pervades our criminal jus-
tices policies. In its stinging critique of the Ferguson Police
Department, the Department of Justice stated, “Over time, Fergu-
son’s police and municipal court practices have sown deep mistrust
between parts of the community and the police department, under-
mining law enforcement legitimacy among African Americans in
particular.”165 Later in its report DOJ advised, “[r]estoring trust in
law enforcement will require recognition of the harms caused by
Ferguson’s law enforcement practices, and diligent, committed col-
laboration with the entire Ferguson community.166
And in his speech at the NAACP’s 106th national convention in
July 2015, President Obama stated:
A growing body of research shows that people of color are
more likely to be stopped, frisked, questioned, charged, de-
tained. African Americans are more likely to be arrested. They
are more likely to be sentenced to more time for the same
165. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach-
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
166. Id. at 6.
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crime. And one of the consequences of this is, around one
million fathers are behind bars. Around one in nine African
American kids has a parent in prison.
What is that doing to our communities? What’s that doing
to those children? Our nation is being robbed of men and
women who could be workers and taxpayers, could be more
actively involved in their children’s lives, could be role models,
could be community leaders, and right now they’re locked up
for a non-violent offense.167
Significantly, these comments recognize the impact of policing
and sentencing on real neighborhoods and the daily lives of the
people who live there. They reflect a shifting perspective of the fed-
eral government, an understanding that aggressive policing and
incarcerating millions of young, black men has had devastating con-
sequences for families and communities, and a recognition that
these policies must change
The New York and Maryland laws that reallocate incarcerated in-
dividuals back to their home communities signify one step towards
a shift in emphasis away from isolation and segregation of the incar-
cerated individual and towards rehabilitation and reintegration.
Hopefully this step is a reflection of a bigger shift, a shift towards
acknowledging that punishment and incarceration are institutions
for the expression of social values, sensibility, and morality, rather
than an instrumental means to a punitive end. By recognizing that
incarcerated individuals are people with homes and families to
which one day most will return, and that those homes sit within
functioning communities deserving an equal voice in our govern-
ment, these laws may signal the beginning of another pendulum
swing in the long, troubled history of criminal punishment in this
country.
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